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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAROL JEAN SHAW, now known
as CAROL JEAN SHAW LORD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)
)

)
vs.

Case No:

HAROLD ELIJAH SHAW,

18367

)

Defendant and
Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an Order on
Order to Show Cause Re Modification of Divorce Decree and a
Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause and the denial of
miscellaneous motions by plaintiff filed thereafter.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The plaintiff filed an Affidavit and Motion For Order
to Show Cause In Re Contempt, which matter was filed on
September 22, 1980.

A response to the Motion was filed by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the defendant, and through no fault of the defendant, the
matter did not come on for hearing until December 18, 1981.
Following the hearing, the court entered its Findings of
Fact and conclusions of Law and Order on Order to Show Cause
on February 5, 1982.

Thereafter, the court entered a

Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause, which
Supplemental Order was signed April 16, 1982.

Thereafter,

certain motions were made by the plaintiff and a plaintiff
i.n intervention which were denied by the District Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The defendant-respondent requests that the orders of
the District Court be affirmed, and that the appeal be
dismissed and that the matter be remanded to the District
Court for the imposition of attorney's fees on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent believes the Statement of Facts
submitted by the appellant is inaccurate in that it appears
to be her "version" of the facts.

For that reason the

respondent prefers to set out a different Statement of
Facts.
The pla.intiff and defendant were married on January 16,
1959.

The plaintiff and defendant had six children born as

issue of this marriage.

2
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The plaintiff originally filed a summons and complaint
for divorce in the District Court of Weber County, State of
Utah, on January 13, 1978,

(R.199-203).

In the original

divorce proceedings the plaintiff was represented by

w.

Brent West.

The defendant was represented by Mann, Hadfield

and Thorne.

Over a period of some months, negotiations took

place between the respective counsels, to arrive at an out
of court settlement.
On September 28, 1980, a written stipulation was
ultimately reached between the parties to determine the:
possession and the equity in the family home, custody of
minor children, child support, alimony, debts and
obligations, division of personal property, filing of tax
returns, health and accident coverage, and the awarding of
tax exemptions on the minor children.

(R.208-210).

The plaintiff then took a default divorce {R.207) and
the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Decree of
Divorce" were signed on October 11, 1978, to become final
one month from date of entry.

{R.211-215 and 216-219).

On July 1, 1980, the plaintiff married her present
husband, Robert L. Lord.

{R.364, paragraph 5 of Findings of

Fact).
Under date of July 31, 1980, Robert Lord sent a letter
to Mr. Shaw telling him he must continue paying alimony or
Mr. Lord would collect it through court action.

3

(R.239).
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Mr. Shaw had his attorney contact Mr. Lord and attempt
to resolve the matter without court proceedings.

Following

telephone conversations a letter dated August 6, 1980 was
sent to Mr. Lord outlining why Mr. Shaw understood alimony
would terminate upon remarriage.

(R.240).

After other telephone conversations failed to resolve
the question of alimony, Mr. Lord threatened and ultimately
did file on August 29, 1980 a tort action against Mr. Shaw
seeking to recover $256,500.00 for "alleged" torts committed
by Mr. Shaw against his former wife during the time they
were married.

(R.241-242).

Mr. Shaw believed and alleged

that the tort action was filed to attempt to coerce him into
accepting Mr. Lord's demands that he pay alimony.
(R.227-228 paragraph 5; R.249 paragraph 5;)

(T.98-99 note:

transcript references are to stamped page numbers, rather
than typed page numbers).
The tort action was dismissed by the trial court on the
defendant's motion .for summary judgment.

The plaintiff,

Mrs. Lord, has filed an appeal on that case which is now
awaiting decision by the Utah Supreme Court.

(see Lord v.

Shaw, case number 17993).
After failing to get Mr. Shaw to meet her demands, Mrs.
Lord through her husband, Attorney Robert L. Lord, filed an
"Affidavit and Motion for Order to Show Cause In Re
Contempt".

(R.221-224).

In the original affidavit and

motion filed on September 22, 1980 the plaintiff claimed the

4
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defendant was delinquent for child support and alimony for
the months of July and August, 1980.

The defendant filed a

response with attached exhibits on September 23, 1980.
{R.225-241).

As part of his "Response", the defendant

alleged that only three children were living with the
plaintiff, that the minor child, Neil, had come to live with
the defendant, and the defendant requested the court to
determine what, if any, child support was in arrears for the
months in question.
The hearing was set for September 24, 1980, the
plaintiff was not present but was represented by her
counsel, Robert Lord.

The defendant was present and

represented by his counsel and was ready to proceed.

The

court declined to hear any evidence and determined to have
the matter set for a one-half day hearing.

{R.245).

The defendant filed an "Amended Response"
The plaintiff filed:

a "Motion to Modify" {R.267-268), a

"Motion for Change of Judge"
Trial".

(R.246-266).

(R.269-270) and a "Notice of

Trial was set for December 2, 1980.

On December 1, 1980 the plaintiff filed an objection to
the trial setting {R.295-297) and over the defendant's
objections the matter was continued since Mr. Lord stated he
needed to be a witness and desired to associate other
counsel in the matter.
Following this continuance the defendant attempted to
have the matter set through various telephone calls to the

5
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court administrator's office.

The defendant was finally

advised that all of the district judges normally sitting in
Weber County had disqualified themselves.
Mr. Lord formally withdrew as attorney of record on
August 17, 1981.

(R.312).

The plaintiff then filed an

additional Affidavit and Motion to Reform the Divorce
Decree.

(R.313-316).

The matter was finally set for hearing on December 18,
1981, before the Honorable Douglas

R~

Cornaby.

At the time the matter came for hearing, the defendant
had certain issues which it wanted determined by the court,
and the plaintiff had certain issues which she desired to be
heard by the court.

The court indicated that it desired to

have all of the issues heard since many had arisen in the 16
months since the matter had originally been set for hearing.
(T.54).

It appears from the record that the issues which the
parties presented for hearing were:
(a)

Whether alimony terminated upon marriage or

whether it continued for a three-year period until September
1, 1981, in spite of plaintiff's marriage.
(b)

What child support delinquencies, if any existed.

(c)

What child support obligation Mr. Shaw owed on the

minor child, Neil, from the time he went to live with Mr.
Shaw until he reached majority.
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(d)

Whether any child support should have been ordered

for the oldest son, Rick.
(e)

Whether a change of circumstance existed, such

that child support should be increased.
(f)

Whether the divorce decree should be amended to

grant Mrs. Lord the tax exemptions for Federal and State
income tax purposes.
(g)

How the court should award certain items of

personal property in dispute.
(h)

Whether attorney's fees should be awarded to

either side.
(i)

Whether the proceeds from the sale of the home

should be awarded; and if so, how the proceeds should be
divided between the parties.

(j)

Whether sanctions should be applied against the

plaintiff for failure to answer the defendant's discovery
requests.
The plaintiff had three witnesses testify at the
hearing:

Carol Shaw Lord, the plaintiff; Robert Lord, her

husband; and Brent West, her attorney at the time of the
divorce.

The plaintiff also introduced 6 exhibits.

exhibits were:

These

a) her handwritten statement of her 1981

income, b) a letter from Mr. Thorne to Mr. West, c) earning
statements from Jordan School District, d) earning
statements from Tender Touch Nursery, f) expenses testified

7
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to by Mr. Lord, and g) shelter expenses testified to by
Mr. Lord.

(R.360).

The defendant had four witnesses testify at the
hearing:

Mr. Shaw, the defendant; Richard Shaw, the

parties' son; Edna Gorley, a neighbor; and Evelyn Thompson,
the defendant's mother.
exhibits:

The defendant also introduced six

1) a series of six letters between respective

counsel prior to the divorce stipulation; 2) Mr. Shaw's
record of expenditures; 3) Mr. Shaw's monthly living
expenses; 4) seven copies of checks; 5) Mr. Shaw's record of
child support payments; and 6) Mr. Shaw's proposed division
of savings from the sale of the family home with attached
documents.

(R.

360).

The court examined the exhibits and the testimony and
issued a ruling from the bench.

(T.172-197).

The court

essentially resolved the issues in favor of the defendant's
positions.
At the conclusion of the hearing on December 18, 1981,
there was considerable discussion as to how certain credits
and offsets should adjust the division of proceeds from the
sale of the family home.

The court went through those in

great detail, and gave a decision as to how the various
credits should be awarded.

The court then requested that

each party submit any affidavits they may have regarding
payments made to fix up the home to have it ready for sale,

8
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and directed that they be done within 10 days from the date
of hearing.

(T.180).

Following the submission of the affidavits, the court
on January 4, 1982 by written ruling,

(R.350) made his award

of credits regarding the payments made by the plaintiff.
The defendant was given a credit in the amount of $130.70
for his share of expenses, which amount was apparently not
objected to by the plaintiff.
Mr. Shaw's counsel prepared the "Findings" and
"Decree" and submitted them to the plaintiff for approval on
December 31, 1981 (R.384).
was received.

No response from the plaintiff

On January 12, 1982 and January 15, 1982,

Mr. Shaw's counsel submitted some changes to the plaintiff
(R.385,386) and again no response was made by the plaintiff.
Finally on February 2, 1982, Mr. Shaw's counsel requested
the court to review the "Findings" and "Decree" since no
word had been received from the plaintiff.

{R.387).

The court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on February 5, 1982, and also signed the Order on
Order to Show Cause Re Modification of Divorce Decree (see
R.361-375).
Under letter dated February 3, 1982 the plaintiff sent
to Mr. Shaw's counsel revisions to the Findings which were
totally different than the judge's decision.

By letter

dated February 8, 1982 the plaintiff was apprised that the

9
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Findings and Order prepared by the defendant were signed by
the judge on February 5, 1982.

(R.398).

On March 3, 1982 the plaintiff filed a Motion and Order
for Extension of Time to File an Appeal (R.376-377), which
was actually filed in person by Robert Lord, who had
previously withdrawn from the case.

At the time Mr. Lord

filed the Motion the court set a hearing on April 5, 1982 to
resolve any questions including the allowance of claims for
repair costs to the home to get it ready for sale.
(R.456-457).
After the defendant received a copy of the Motion of
Extension to File an Appeal, the defendant filed an
objection to the motion for the reason that an extension of
time would

da~age

the defendant in that the defendant had

over $16,000 equity from the sale of the home which had been
tied up since September of 1980, and the defendant had still
not received any money from his share of the proceeds.
(R.381-388).
Mr. Stanger then withdrew as attorney of record (R.380)
and Ronald

c.

Barker entered an appearance.

(R.379).

on

March 23, 1982, the plaintiff then filed a Motion to Vacate
Findings, Conclusions and Judgments (R.399-401) and filed
her proposed Findings and Order.

(R.402 1 406).

The defendant

filed his objection to the Motion to Vacate and his
objection to the plaintiff's proposed Findings.

(R.389-398).

10
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The plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal on April 2,
1982 (R.419) and failed to notify either the court or
opposing counsel that she would not appear on the previously
set April 5, 1982 hearing.
On April 5, 1982 the defendant and his counsel appeared
but neither the plaintiff, her husband, or her counsel
attended.

The Court had to telephone the plaintiff's

attorney to see why they were not in court.

The Court was

told that since they had filed a notice of appeal the
previous Friday, they did not intend on appearing at the
hearing.

(T. 2) •

The Court proceeded with the hearing and ruled that the
"Findings" and "Order" submitted by the plaintiff did not
reflect the Court's findings or decision.

(R.458, T.2).

The Court ruled that the failure of the plaintiff to appear
waived any objection she may have to the Court receiving by
affidavit the costs of repair to the home.

The Court ruled

that the proceeds from the sale of the home should be
released to the defendant immediately except that $3,000
should be put in a trust account pending resolution of the
appeal.

(T.11-12; R.458; R.476).

the plaintiff to pay attorney fees

The Court also ordered
(T.11; R.476) and the

court further ruled:
"The actions of the plaintiff and Robert Lord,
her husband and former attorney of record,
appear to be designed to harass and designed
to try to financially break the defendant,
and are not a good faith legal effort by
the plaintiff." (R.478 paragraph 7)

11
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(See also supplemental transcript of hearing
held April 5, 1982, page 11).
Following the hearing, "Special Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" (R.473-478) and "Supplemental Order on
Order to Show Cause"

(R.453-455) were signed by Judge

Cornaby.
The plaintiff then filed an "Objection to the Entry of
Order and Motion to Delay Entry of Order"

(R.451).

This was

denied by the Court {R.456) who pointed out that the April
5, 1982 hearing was set and held at the specific request of
the plaintiff who then chose not to appear.
Robert L. Lord on April 27, 1982 filed with the Court a
motion entitled: "Motion to Intervene; Motion to Vacate
Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause; Motion to Vacate
Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Motion to
Vacate Ruling; Motion to Modify the Aforesaid; and Request
for Oral and Evidentiary Hearing" {R.485-487) and also filed
affidavits in support of the motions.
On April 29, 1982 Mr. Barker withdrew as attorney of
record for the plaintiff.

{R.488).

On April 28, 1982, Lowell Sununerhays filed as attorney
for plaintiff a "Motion for New Trial, Motion to Vacate,
Modify or Amend, and Request for Oral and
Hearing" {R.469).

~videntiary

Also on April 28, 1982, Robert L. Lord

filed a "Motion for New Trial".
Cornaby denied all motions filed.

On May 5, 1982, Judge
{R.472).

12
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As part of the April 5, 1982 hearing, the court
specifically ordered that the monies currently held in
Mountain States Savings in the names of plaintiff and
defendant be divided equally, with $3,000.00 to be held in
trust to cover any issues pending appeal, and the
defendant's amount was to be turned over to him immediately.
The Court also ordered that this condition would apply to
the extension of time in which to file the appeal.

Since

the court order, the plaintiff has absolutely refused to
cooperate or allow the same to be done.

{R. 454).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO
PAY ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AUTOMATICALLY
TERMINATED UPON PLAINTIFF'S MARRIAGE.
The general rule in the State of Utah is that alimony
terminates upon the marriage of the former spouse.

This

general rule has been declared to be state policy by the
1979 Legislature.
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(2)

(Supp.1981) sets out this

basic policy:
"(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party shall pay alimony to a former spouse shall
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of
that former spouse, unless that marriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio in which
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case alimony shall resume providing that the party
paying alimony be made a party to the action of
annulment and that party's rights are determined."
(emphasis added)
Even prior to the announced legislative policy
regarding terminating alimony upon remarriage, the Utah
Supreme Court had clearly articulated the rule that alimony
terminated upon marriage.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Austad v. Austad,
2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954), clearly stated that in
the state of Utah alimony terminates upon remarriage of the
wife.

In this regard the Utah Supreme Court made a rather

lengthy discussion of a prior Utah Court case, which may
have given some validity to the proposition that alimony
would not terminate upon remarriage, and the Utah Supreme
Court clearly overturned that prior decision.

In this

regard the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"It appearing that the Myers rule has very little
foundation in the decisions of the courts of our
sister states, of our own state, or in reason, to
induce us to adhere to it we conclude that
notwithstanding what has been said in earlier
cases, there is implicit in the divorce decree the
provision that the alimony continues only so long
as the wife remains unmarried. Accordingly the
alimony awarded plaintiff terminated upon her
'd 58 •
remarriage.... II ~·
1

The respondent appreciates that under the decision
announced in the Austad case there may be some exceptional
situations where alimony would not terminate upon
remarriage.
"In reaching this decision we are not to be
understood as holding that the same result would
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eventuate where a sum of alimony was decreed in
lien of dower, or in settlement of property rights
acquired by the wife, or where the alimony is
awarded in a lump sum payable in installments.
And we further observe that under some exceptional
circumstances this result might be so
unconscionable or inequitable that the court,
under its equitable powers would decree that the
wife does not lose her right to alimony upon
remarriage.
In such instance the burden would be
upon the wife to prove those facts." id. 58
(footnotes omitted)
In the instant case one is thus faced with determining
whether the divorce decree "specifically provides otherwise"
that alimony would not terminate upon remarriage or whether
the alimony awarded Mrs. Lord was "in a lump sum payable in
installments".
The divorce decree reads as follows:
"5. The Defendant further agrees to pay to the
Plaintiff the sum of $125.00 per month as and for
alimony. This alimony is to run for a period of
three years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the
end of that time, the Plaintiff agrees to
permanently waive any future alimony.
6. Both parties acknowledge that the Defendant's
payment of the house payment is included as a part
of the child support and alimony and is not in
addition to those payments. The house payment
will be made directly to the mortgage company on
the first of each month. The balance will be paid
directly to the plaintiff by the 20th of each
man th • " ( R. 218) •
There is nothing in the divorce decree or in the Findings of
Fact to suggest alimony would not terminate upon her
marriage.
Also the language of the Divorce Decree does not mean
the alimony was a "lump sum payable in installments".

Lump

sum alimony judgments have traditionally been characterized
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by a specific sum being stated, after which a provision is
included which stipulates the manner in which the sum is to
be paid.

The essence of lump sum is this stating of a

specific sum certain.

The installment payment provision, if

such was decreed, was merely a method of carrying the
judgment into effect.

Instructive in this regard is the

language of the court in Morris v. Morris (Fla. App.1973)
272 So. 2d 203, wherein it reads:
" •.. lump sum alimony may properly be paya.ble in
installments, but in the cases reviewed the amount
awarded was for a specific sum to be paid in
full."
Also see Cann v. Cann

(Fla. App. 1976) 334 So.2d 325.

The alimony provision in the present case is dramatic
in contrast.

The court stated no specific lump sum.

The

alimony provision was structured as a continuing obligation
on the part of respondent to pay his former wife, a sum
certain, that being $125.00 per month, which obligation
would only last three years at the longest or until she
remarried.
The trial court clearly construed the alimony provision
to terminate upon remarriage, and also found that the
negotiations leading up to the stipulation provided it would
terminate upon the plaintiff's marriage.
The court in announcing its decision from the bench
stated:
"THE COURT: In ruling on this matter the Court
will take the matters item by item. The Court is
going to deal first with the alimony question. I
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think [plaintiff's] counsel, of course, has
objected to the Court going behind the decree,
that the decree speaks for itself on its face, and
the Court believes that the decree does soeak for
itself on its face; but my interpretation-of what
it says, obviously, is different than the way
at least some of the way you are interpreting that
matter. The court does not find this to be a lump
sum alimony. The Court -- or in that kind of
order the Court finds that was $125 per month
alimony.
It was contemplated that the plaintiff
was going to stay single. While that may have
been contemplated and then, as a matter of fact,
worked out to be that way, this was just like any
normal provision would have been put in a decree
for alimony.
I think that the provision
terminates on marriage and the Court finds that
the marriage did take place July 1st, 1980, and
that terminated [alimony] at that time.
If the
Court goes behind the decree, and I believe that
is the general -- that's the way the Utah law has
it now, if the Court goes behind it and then
begins to look at testimony offered today as to
what the testimony between the parties are, I
still come up with the same answer.
The letters
between counsel seem to be that that was an agreed
thing, specifically, by the defendant, that it
would terminate after three years or remarriage,
and remarriage not having put into it.
It's
clear, too, from the plaintiff's testimony that
she said that she intended it to run a full three
years. The reason she intended it to run a full
three years -- this comes from counsel and not
from her -- is because she didn't anticipate
marriage.
She was in school and she was going to
need it for that full period of time. At the time
of remarriage the law has -- and has a presumption
in that that responsibility ceases with the prior
husband and falls to the present husband.
And so,
it's no longer on the defendant. {T.173-174).
The court decision that the intent was that alimony
would terminate upon plaintiff's marriage is amply supported
by the record.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 a series of six letters clearly
shows the parties agreed alimony would terminate upon her
marriage.
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Mr. Thorne's letter to Mr. West, dated September 14,
1978 contains this provision:
"Mr. Shaw would also pay $125.00 per month for
alimony for three (3) years or until Mrs. Shaw
remarries . " ( R. 3 6 0 ) •
Mr. West's letter of September 20, 1978 to Mr. Thorne
states:
"This letter is to advise you that we have
accepted the terms set out in your letter dated
September 14, 1978, in regards to child support
and alimony." (R. 360) •
On cross-examination at trial Mr. West also admitted
that the provisions in the September 14, 1978 and September

20, 1978 letters was the final agreement reached on alimony.
"Q
(By Mr. Thorne) Were there any other further
negotiations that you recall that we had which
would provide that alimony was not to terminate on
remarriage?
A.
No.
the Only negotiations I recall is our
exchange of letters.
I recall no specific phone
call between yourself and I where we actually
discussed that, other than what was in the written
correspondence.
MR. THORNE: That's all.
MR. FITT: You may come down, sir.
Thank
you.
THE COURT: You may step down and be excused."
(T. 9 4) •

The appellant's position that the alimony was to have
been paid for three years irrespective of her marriage is
simply contrary to law and to the facts as found by the
trial court.
This Court has often stated the rule, ·that on appeal
considerable deference will be given to the trial court's

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

findings.

In Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d

1297, 1299 (1981) this Court stated:
"[O]n review this Court will accord considerable
deference to the judgment of the trial court due
to its advantaged position and will not disturb
the action of that court unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the
trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principles of law. Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah,
615 P.2d 1218 (1980); Carter v. Carter Utah, 563
P.2d 177 (1977) Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d
1072 (1977); Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d
514 (1976); Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277,
488 p. 2d 308 (1971). ii
The record amply supports the trial court's decision
that alimony would terminate upon plaintiff's marriage.

POINT II

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPORT PAYMENTS
FOR THE MINOR CHILD NEIL AS ACCRUED FROM THE
TIME OF HIS VOLUNTARY REMOVAL FROM PLAINTIFF'S
CUSTODY TO THE RESIDENCE OF DEFENDANT.
Although recognition is duly granted to the rule that
the divorce decree fixes the support obligations between
parties, and that they cannot modify or change their
obligations by their conduct, it is also recognized that
specific circumstances may make adjustments necessary.
In Stanton v. Stanton, 30 U.2d 315, 320, 517 P.2d 1010
(1974) this court stated:
"However, in matters concerning the custody and
support of children, because of their highly
equitable nature, it is appropriate for the trial
court to take into consideration the entire
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circumstances in making any order of enforcement
of the decree, by contempt or otherwise, having in
mind his equitable powers, to make any adjustment
he may think fair and justified."
Courts have recognized that it may be unjust to require
a father to pay child support payments to a former spouse
when the child has come to live with his father.
Recognizing the equities of such a situation the court in
Nabors v. Nabors (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) 354 So 2d 277 declared:
"When an order requires a divorced husband to make
periodic payments for the support of children and
he has supported the children while they lived
with him, the wife cannot recover payments for
support during that period, nor during the period
third persons were supporting the children or the
children were supporting themselves."
A case on nearly all fours with the instant dispute is
found in Strum v. Strum, 317 NE 2d 59 (Ill.App.1974).

There

a sixteen year 11 month old girl left the custody of her
mother to live with her father.

One year later, the mother

brought suit to recover the support accrued under the child
support decree.

The court ruled that the mother's conduct

presented a situation where equitable estoppel should apply
to prevent recovery.

Specifically, the court said:

"It seems abundantly clear that the plaintiff
either consented to or acquiesced in Cynthia
living with her father and he was supporting her.
She became eighteen years of age August 11, 1972
and at the time of the hearing on the rule to show
cause was past eighteen years of age.
It was not
until July of 1972 that any question of
termination of payments for her support was
raised.
[she had left her mother's custody in
July of 1971]. Under these circumstances, it is
our opinion that this situation is appropriate for
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and that as to
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Cynthia, the trial court properly dismissed the
petition for a rule to show cause".
A close scrutiny of Strum reveals a surprising
similarity of facts with those of the instant matter.

In

both cases a child, within approximately one year of gaining
majority, decides to live with his non-custodial parent.
That parent supports the child until it reaches its majority
one year later.

The custodial parent delays action to

recover support for nearly one year or longer.

Strum

obtained this delay by not filing suit; Mrs. Shaw filed
suit, two months after the departure, to recover alimony
payments.

The subject of Neil's support was not raised in

that complaint, instead his support was raised in trial some
14 months after the filing of the alimony complaint.
The equities of the instant case are sufficient to
remove it from application of the general rule.

First, the

appellant's suit of September 1980 was to recover alimony.
Subsequently, appellant obtained a series of continuances of
the matter for fourteen months.

The respondent was

blameless in this causing of delay.

The presence of the

suit prevented the respondent from obtaining a timely
modification of the custody which would have formally
relieved him of the obligation to make Neil's child support
payments.

Appellant's behavior resulted in

defendant-respondent's supporting Neil for a full year
without the benefit of legal sanction.
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Appellant's cited case law is deficient in the present
case.

The situations involved there consisted of instances

where the supporting parent assumed support for short
periods of tirnei e.g. weekends, weeks, and at most three
months.

Here, Mr. Shaw has supported his son for more than

a full year, a considerably longer period of time.
Justifiably, the expenses of a weekend and such short
periods of time should not be subtracted from the support
obligation.
in budgeting.

The inclusion of such would cause a disruption
In the instant case, a full year of support

does not present these issues.

Instead, an allowance of the

petition would result in a windfall allowance to appellant,
in reality an unjust enrichment.
The trial court clearly perceived that under the facts
of the present case no child support arrearage should be
given to Mrs. Lord, since she accepted Neil's decision to
live with his father and Mr. Shaw paid all of Neil's
expenses.
''I am going to talk about child support next. The
provisions in the decree are clear as to child
support. That it will be $75 per child per month
under certain circumstances. One circumstance, of
course, is that up to the time they become 18
years of age and the other, if they are in school.
I think generally inherent in this is, of course,
the plaintiff in this case [is] also supporting
him. On about August 1st of 1980 the plaintiff
ceased to support the one child, Neil, and has
asked for child support because there was no
[change made in the] decree.
Now, of course, these matters were initially filed
shortly thereafter in this court.
I won't look up
the exact date, but my memory tells me that it was
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somewhere in September of 1980 that this action
began, roughly 15 months before we get into court
for trial and for a final hearing on it. And I
suppose if the matter had been heard back 15
months ago or someplace close to that, that the
decree could have been amended if the Court
decided it was appropriate. The court is going to
think it proper that the defendant should not be
required to pay support for the child while he is
actually supporting the child, and though the
decree provides for a specific amount of child
support, the Court should amend that decree order
-- directing it to be effective as of August 1st,
1980. Of course, in this area this is an
equitable doctrine to try to take the burden off
or put a burden on the proper parties. The
plaintiff has an obligation to support just as the
defendant does.
I am not trying to lift it off of
one shoulder and place it on the other.
(T.174-175)
(see also R.365 paragraph 10).

POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SHOWN A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES; THEREFORE
CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED.
Appellant's position contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to find a sufficient change
of circumstances to permit a modification of child support
payments.
The standard to determine whether child support should
be increased is whether there has been a substantial change
of circumstances from the situation existing at the time of
the divorce.

see King v. King, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155

(1973).
on appeal the standard used is that the decision of the
trial court on a petition for an increase in child support
will not be disturbed unless it appears that the evidence so
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preponderates against the trial court's findings that
inequity or injustice would result.
579 P.2d 911,

see Owen v. Owen, Utah,

(1978).

As the court noted in OWen decision:
" •.. due to the advantaged position and
the responsibilities of the trial court
in such-matters, we will accord some verity
to his actions; and we will not disturb his
findings nor the determination made thereon
unless it appears that the evidence preponderates against them so that an inequity or
injustice has resulted." 579 P.2d at 913.
The Owen case is insightful for many of the contentions
raised by appellant.

There the plaintiff argued for

increased support on the basis of inflation, the changing
needs of growing children and the feeling that plaintiff
deserved a better class of living environment.

Similar

attention was also given to the increased salary of the
defendant husband.
The Owen case also gave other guidelines to use in
determining proper support payments.

First, both the mother

and the father are responsible for the support of children;
second, the issue for the court to adjudicate was the needs
of the children and not necessarily the manner and standard
of living desired by the plaintiff; third, while an increase
in the father's income is important, it is only to be
considered along with the other facts and circumstances
concerning the needs of the children and the ability of the
parents to pay for them; fourth, the past payment record of
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father can be used to judge the equities as between the
parties and the welfare of the children.
At trial the court found that at the time of the
divorce Mrs. Lord was making $150.00 per month, she now
makes over $500.00 per month; the court found that while the
plaintiff's housing costs have gone up, they have
voluntarily increased so plaintiff and her husband could
live in a more expensive home.

The court also found that

while the defendant's gross income increased, his take home
income only slightly increased, and while the defendant may
not have a legal obligation to do so, he is solely
supporting the three older children.

(R.

364-367}.

In stating his oral decision the court made these
comments:
"The changed circumstances, of course, really came
with the marriage, the remarriage of plaintiff
Lord in 1980, July 1.
In September of that year
they purchased a new home. While necessity may
have required that, they get a larger house for
the children that would be more expensive than in
the apartment that Mr. Lord was currently renting.
There is nothing that required them, of course, to
buy an $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 home ... " ( T • 176 } •
"All of this that I am saying persuades the Court,
however, that though the plaintiff's expenses have
gone up considerably, they voluntarily gone up,
and I suppose that if perhaps -- a poor example,
but I suppose if a person had a hundred thousand
dollar income per year, they could show where the
amount expended per child well might grow
proportionately, and if it were $50,000 income, it
would be some proration less.
If it were 25, it
would be some proration less, but it would always
grow as the income grows, because people just
normally, not always, but normally, spend more
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both on themselves and children as this takes
place. They perhaps -- well, I won't go into more
detail. All of this persuades me that there has
not been shown before the Court today a change of
circumstances such as would justify the Court in
changing the original award of $75 per month per
child. Cost of living, obviously, has made the
cost of -- without all these other things -- has
made the cost to the plaintiff go up. The
defendant has, obviously, had an income increase,
gross income increase of almost $4,000. He has
testified that the net increase is very slightly
above what it was initially at the time of the
divorce. He has three children in his home to
support, but has no legal obligation to support
them under our law, and yet, I recognize parents
do take that responsibility upon themselves to
support to sorne degree, if not a major portion of
the support, for adult children when they are
living in the home. Just as I would if they were
in my home. And it's complimentary to the
parents, but it's not a fact that the Court can
take into account so far as changed circumstances
go. But, even all of those things being
considered and discountina the three children in
the home, I don't think that there has been a
showing that the defendant's circumstances have
changed enough that would justify the change of
the order above the $75 a month per child."
(T-177-179).
The plaintiff in her brief attempts to show her income
at the time of the divorce was significantly more than the
trial court found.

But counsel admits on page 5 of his

brief that such evidence was not introduced at trial.
It is clear that the trial court's findings and
decision are not only supported but are mandated by the
actual evidence introduced at trial.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF PROCEEDS
FROM THE SALE OF THE HOME SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
The original divorce decree provided for the division
of proceeds from the sale of the home.

The decree provided:

"The Plaintiff will be awarded the permanent and
exclusive occupancy of the parties' home located
at 2728 North 600 East, North Ogden, Utah. Title
to the house will remain in the joint name (sic)
of the parties until such time as they divide the
equity. The Defendant will continue to make a
monthly house payment of $250.00 for a period of
three years. At the end of that time, the parties
agree to divide the equity in the home equally.
Payment of the Defendant's equity will be made
upon the occurance of any one of the following
events:
a.
The voluntary sale of the home by the
Plaintiff.
b.
The remarriage of the Plaintiff.
c.
The youngest child having reached the
age of 18.
No interest will accumulate on the Defendant's
equity. During the period of three years in which
the Defendant makes the house payment, he will be
able to claim any and all tax deductions as long
as he is current on the payments." (R.217).
The plaintiff married Robert L. Lord on July 1, 1980.
Technically the defendant was entitled to his one-half of
the equity at that time.

However, realizing that the

plaintiff desired to move to Salt Lake City, the parties
placed the home for sale.

An earnest money agreement was

entered into with the parties, as sellers, and a Mr. & Mrs.
Price, as buyers.

(Def. Ex 6 p.2).
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The home was sold and the parties received over
$34,000.00 as their equity.

The plaintiff and her husband

refused to disburse Mr. Shaw's money to him and threatened
not to complete the sale.

(T.100-101).

During this same

time the tort action and this action were filed and in order
to save the house sale, Mr. Shaw accepted their demand to
place the entire proceeds in a trust account until this
legal matter was heard.

(He obviously did not know the

legal proceedings could be prolonged such that it would be
years until he received his share of the money.)
The trial court started with the premise that the
proceeds from the sale of the home should be divided equally
between the parties; and explicitly ruled that the costs of
repair were to be submitted by affidavit within ten days,
(T.180).
The court then gave each party certain credits before
the division.

At the time of trial all parties finally

agreed to the rent and repair credits. (T.192).
The court's decision as reflected in the ''Findings of
Fact" was that Mrs. Lord should receive credits of a) $60.00
for back child support, b) $166.48 for adjustment of rent
and child support for September 1980; c) $225.00 for October
1980; and d) $564.00 which was deducted from the repair
costs of the driveway; the plaintiff was also allowed
$503.93 for her share of the home repairs.
total credits were $1,519.41.

Mrs. Lord's

(R.367-368).
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Mr. Shaw was given credits of a) $550.00 to equalize
savings withdrawals made on April 17, 1981; b) $125.00 for
rent received by Mrs. Lord in August 1980; and c) $130.70
for his costs of repair to the home.

Mr. Shaw's total

credits were $805.70.
The difference in the credits each received was
$713.71.

The court thus ruled Mrs. Lord was to first

receive $713.71 and the balance in the account was to be
divided equally.
The court specifically ruled that all repair costs were
to be submitted within 10 days of the trial.

(T.180).

The

plaintiff in her brief argues that the court failed to
consider her supplemental affidavit claiming expenses of
$2,589.61.

The record clearly shows, however, that the

supplemental affidavit was not filed until January 14, 1982,
(R.358) nearly a month after the hearing and ten days after
the Judge had ruled on the repair costs.

(R.350).

It is also submitted that even if it was error to
determine repair costs by affidavit rather than through
shown witnesses or other evidentiary means, that such an
error was waived by the plaintiff at the original hearing
when it was agreed by both parties to submit such costs by
affidavit.

(T.180).

The plaintiff further waived any claimed errors made by
the court by failing to appear at the April 5, 1982 hearing.
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The April 5, 1982 hearing was set at the specific
request of the plaintiff by her husband who personally
appeared before the trial court.

(R.456).

One of the very

purposes for holding the hearing on that date was to resolve
any questions as to what costs were allowable.

(T. 4-5) •

The plaintiff cannot fail to appear at a hearing and then
argue that she be allowed another hearing on remand to
determine the very issues which she chose not to pursue
prior to her appeal.

POINT V
THE INSTANT APPE.A.L SHOULD BE DISMISSED
AS PREMATURE; AND ALL FINDINGS AND ORDEHS
ENTERED AFTER THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WERE
FILED SHOULD STAND.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow for an appeal
to be taken under the provisions of Rule 72.

Therein it

states:
'' (a) An ar>peal may be taken to the
Supreme Court from all final orders and
judgments; in accordance with these
ru 1 es .... "
Conformance to the rule demands that the judgment
appealed be final.

The Utah court was required to interpret

this finality requirement in Peterson v. Ohio Copper co,
Utah, 266 P.1050 (1928).

There the appellant had filed a

notice of appeal one day after motioning for a new trial.
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The motion had not been acted upon by the court.

In

refusing to hear the appeal the court said:
"The constitution of this state
(Art.8 Sec. 9) as interpreted by this
court, permits of (sic) an appeal to this court
from a judgment of the district court only
in cases where the judgment of the district
court is final.
The question therefore is,
when does the judgment of a district court
for purposes of an appeal become final in a
case where there is a motion for a new trial
reasonably made after the entry of the
judgment or decree?
The uniform holding of this court in such cases
has been that the judgment becomes final when the
motion for a new trial is overruled.
Consequently, the effect of a motion for a new
trial, when seasonably made, is to suspend the
judgment or decree for purposes of appeal
until the motion has been disposed of."
266 P. at 1050.
Similar logic is found in the case of First National
Bank v. Nielson, 60 Utah 227, 208 P.522.

(1922).

There the

court said:
"This court, in an unbroken line of decisions,
has held that, where a motion for a new trial
has been seasonably filed, the motion
suspends the finality of the judgment, ... and
that while the motion is pending and undetermined an appeal is premature.
208 P at 523.
(emphasis added)
Support is found for this position in Bowman v. Ogden
City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P 561 (1908); and Watson v. Mayberry,
15 Utah 265, 49 P 479 (1897).
The Peterson court, in dismissing an argument on the
procedural interrelationship of motion for new trial and
notice of appeal noted:
"If it should be contended that the taking
of the appeal was in effect a waiver or abandonment of the motion for a new trial it is
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doubtful if such contention would be sound.
Waiver must be intentional. 40 eye. 264. The
same is true of abandonment. 1 eye. 5. Appellant
had no intention either to waive or abandon his
motion for a new trial because he assigns the
overruling of the motion as error. id at 1052
The Utah position of classifying an appeal as premature if
taken while a motion for new trial is undisposed of is
consonant with the holdings of many other jurisdictions.

In

4A CJS Appeal and Error §461 pg. 155 the annotator lists
support as including decisions from Alabama, Colorado,
Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and
Pennsylvania.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73(a) presently
provides for a suspension of the time period allowed for
filing of notice of appeal, upon the submission of timely
motions under rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59.

Rule 50(b) allows

for a granting or denying a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 52(b) entails motions to

amend or make additional findings of fact whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion
is granted.

Rule 59 allows the alteration or amendment, or

the making of new findings and conclusions and also allows a
motion for a new trial.
In light of the past decisions providing that a
judgment is not final pending a Motion for New Trial, it
seems apparent that prematurity should also attach to any
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appeal taken while motions under Rules SO(b), 52(b) and 59
are undisposed of.

The suspension of the appeal time period

by Rule 73(a) indicates that the judgment remains
indefinite, and that continued litigation in the district
court is a reality.

Rule 73(a) should be viewed as an

adoption of Peterson and an extension of that case's
doctrine to the question of prematurity as applicable to the
motions available under Rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59.
It is also clear that the hearing set for April 5, 1981
was set at the time the extension of time for filing appeal
was filed (R.456).

For these reasons it is submitted that

the appeal was filed prematurely.
It is the respondent's position that this court in its
discretion may dismiss any appeal that is filed prematurely.
In Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 231, 419 P.2d 634
1966 this court stated:
"The premature filing of the notice of appeal such
as was done in this case should not be regarded as
a defect which will ipso facto entirely deprive
the appellate court of jurisdiction.
It is an
irregularity which would be grounds for dismissal
of the appeal within the discretion of the court.
Such remedy would undoubtedly be well advised in
the cases where the judgment had not become
definite, or had not become final, or where
remedies before the trial court had not been
exhausted."
There really isn't any dispute that the remedies before
the trial court had not been exhausted since the court and
the defendant were prepared and appeared for the April 5,
1981 hearing to get a final judgment on the motion and
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request filed by the plaintiff.

For these reasons it is

submitted there was a premature filing of an appeal and the
appeal should be dismissed.
Another ground for the dismissal of this ap~eal is the
refusal of the appellant to comply with the condition
imposed for the extension of time to file the appeal.
~hen

Mr. Lord appeared before the trial court on March

3, 1982 and filed the plaintiff's "Motion and Order For
Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal" he represented
and the motion stated, "Defendant will suffer no prejudice
if the time is extended, and it would be in the interest of
justice to grant the additional time." {R.377).
nr. Shaw strongly disagreed that the extension would
not prejudice him.
The granting of an extension under Rule 73{a) to file
an appeal is a discretionary function of the trial court,
and inherent with that discretion is the right to impose any
conditions deemed to be in the interest of justice,
including imposing a condition nunc pro tune.

see Neuringer

v. Wortman, Mont., 607 P.2d 543 {1980); Grover v. Hawthorne,
Oregon, 121 P. 804 {1912).
After the defendant appeared on the April 5, 1981
hearing the trial court ruled as follows:
"That the extension of time granted to plaintiff
in which to file a notice of appeal is conditioned
upon the defendant being entitled to his share of
the proceeds from the sale of the home.
In this
regard it is determined that $3,000.00 shall be
placed in a special trust account with
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Mountainwest Savings and Loan which cannot be
withdrawn except upon joint signature of plaintiff
and defendant, or upon further order of the Court,
and the defendant is entitled to his one-half of
the principal and accrued interest to date he
withdraws his share, and the plaintiff is entitled
to her one-half.
The account number is number
04-001637-14 which had a total of $34,629.13 as of
April 5, 1982." (R. 454) •
There was no doubt in the trial court's mind that this
condition was fair and that the $3,000 would more than cover
any adjustments to the division of proceeds, should this
court reverse any part of the trial court's ruling.

(T.10).

The plaintiff has refused to comply with this
requirement and the appeal should be dismissed since the
imposition of the release of funds was made a condition to
extending the time for appeal.

POINT VI
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
At the April 5, 1982 hearing the trial court made
several findings regarding the conduct of this action by the
plaintiff and her former counsel.

Among these findings are

the following:
"3.
The court thereafter was contacted by Robert
Lord, husband of the plaintiff, who had formerly
been an attorney of record, and who appears to
really be the moving attorney in the matter.
Mr. Lord presented a Motion and Order for
Extension of Time to File an Appeal which was
granted on March 3, 1982, copies of which are in
the court file.
Mr. Lord also requested a hearing
date for plaintiff's motion.
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4. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a Motion to
Vacate the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order and Judgment, and the defendant filed a
response to the plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff
further filed her proposed Findings and
Conclusions with the court.
5.
The Court finds that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law previously signed by this Court
on February 5, 1982 do, in fact, represent the
Findings of the Court and the decision of the
Court, even though they were prepared by
defendant's counsel at the court's request.
6.
The Court specifically finds that the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
submitted by the plaintiff do not reflect the
Findings of this Court, and in particular that
paragraphs 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25,
and 28 do not represent Findings made by the
Court.
7.
One of the purposes for holding the hearing
on April 5, 1982 was to resolve any objections as
to the court allowing evidence of costs to repair
the home for sale, being submitted by affidavit.
The court was prepared to allow testimony
regarding the affidavits to see if the court's
ruling was appropriate. The court finds the
plaintiff has not chosen to pursue that matter by
virtue of failing to appear and the objections of
plaintiff are denied and deemed to be waived.
8.
The Court finds that the hearing set for
April 5th was set at the request of the plaintiff
and that the plaintiff failed to advise either the
court or the defendant or defendant's counsel that
plaintiff would not appear at said hearing.
9.
The Court finds that the plaintiff's Motion
to Vacate the Findings and Conclusions is not in
order and should therefore be denied.
10. The Court finds that the plaintiff is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees for
appearing on this hearing, and in preparing
special Findings and Conclusions and Orders in the
sum of $390.00 and judgment may enter against the
plaintiff for said amount.
11. The Court finds that the plaintiff's
affidavit for additional costs in repairing the
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home is not in order and that the decision as
reflected in the original Findings and Order
signed by the Court reflects the amount of money
the plaintiff is entitled to.
The Court finds that the proceeds from the
sale of the home are presently in a joint account
requiring joint signature of plaintiff and
defendant at Mountainwest Savings and Loan at the
Branch Office located at 114 North Washington
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, and that the account
number is 04-001637-14 and that there exists as of
April 5, 1982 the sum of $34,629.13.
12.

The Court finds that even if an appeal is
taken, the only amounts in dispute would be less
than $3,000.00 from the savings account.

13.

The Court therefore finds that from the
amount held by Mountainwest Savings & Loan there
should be $3,000.00 placed in a trust account
which cannot be released except upon joint
signatures of the parties or upon order of this
Court, and after the $3,000.00 is placed in the
special trust account, that the defendant shall be
entitled to one-half of the balance from the
account. The plaintiff is entitled to the other
half if she desires to withdraw the funds.
14.

The Court finds that Mountainwest Savings &
Loan should disburse to the defendant his share of
the money free and clear of any claim of the
plaintiff.
15.

16. The Court further finds that disbursement of
the money to the defendant is a condition to the
order of extension of time in which to file the
notice of appeal, granted on March 3, 1982.
The Court finds that at the original hearing
of this matter on December 18, 1981 there was
testimony presented that the plaintiff's husband
and former attorney of record, Robert Lord, made
allegations that Mr. Lord would do everything he
could to financially break the defendant. The
Court finds that that's probably what Mr. Lord's
attitude in the matter is, based upon the history
of what has taken place in this court case since
this District Judge has been involved."
17.

(R.475-477).
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The Supplemental Order also contained the following
order:
"7. The actions of the plaintiff and Robert Lord,
her husband and former attorney of record since
this District Judge has been assigned this case,
appear to be a deliberate effort to try to break
the defendant financially and to use their legal
position to punish the defendant, and have not
been made in good faith."
The actions of the plaintiff and her husband, who filed
a petition in intervention, on appeal also seem revealing as
to how they have tried to obstruct, delay, and run up legal
costs of the defendant.

In fact, this court in a previous

motion assessed damages of $100.00 for appellant's failure
to timely file her brief.
Courts have stated that attorney fees are appropriate
damages on appeal where the appellant has used dilatory
tactics, where an appeal lacks merit, or where an appeal is
made in bad faith.

see Varnum v. Grady, Nev, 528 P.2d 1027

(1974); Matter of Suesz Estate, Kansas, 613 P.2d 947 (1980);
Hock v. Lienco Cedar Products, Mont, 634 P.2d 1174 (1981).
"Where there was no probable cause for appeal by
defendant from order refusing to set aside default
judgment, and it appeared that appeal was part of
long continued and calculated scheme by defendant
to prevent enforcement of valid obligation for
which defendant had no proper defense, award
of .•• damages for delay resulting from appeal was
warranted." Stirling v. Dari-Delite, Inc.,
Oregon, 494 P.2d 252 motion denied, 498 P.2d 753
(1972).
"Since disposition made by District Judge was
faultless on the basis of prevailing law and there
was no room for dispute, no reasonable cause
existed for appeal; accordingly, the Supreme Court
would impose a penalty, in addition to attorney
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fees, without proof of pecuniary loss or other
damage. Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil co.,
Wyoming, 638 P.2a 147 (1981)
It is respectfully suggested that this case presents a
situation where the matter should be remanded to the trial
court for an award of attorney fees for services rendered on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
This record on appeal presents a rather bizarre episode
of legal maneuverings in behalf of the plaintiff.

While the

legal proceedings have been prolonged and time consuming,
they have also been costly to the defendant-respondent in
that he has been denied the use of money he is legitimately
entitled to from the proceeds of the sale of the family
home, and he has been required to expend extensive money to
defend himself in court against his former wife.
It is submitted that the record on appeal amply
supports the legal positions taken by the defendant.
1.

The terms of the divorce decree providing that the

defendant paid alimony to the plaintiff automatically
terminated upon the plaintiff's marriage.
2.

The plaintiff is not entitled to any child support

payments for the minor child, Neil, which may have accrued
from the time Neil voluntarily left his mother's home to
reside with his father.

39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

The plaintiff has not shown a substantial change

of circumstances sufficient to increase the child support
obligations paid by the defendant, and there has been no
abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to
increase child support.

Also, there is no evidence

presented on appeal to show that the trial court abused this
discretion in failing to change the divorce decree as it
relates to tax exemptions on the minor children for Federal
and State income tax purposes.
4.

The trial court's division of proceeds from the

sale of the home should be affirmed.

The plaintiff should

first be awarded the sum of $713.71 less the attorney fees
awarded at the April 5, 1981 hearing of $390.00 less any
awards of attorney's fees and costs allowed by this court on
appeal.
5.

This appeal should be dismissed as having been

filed prematurely, and all Findings and Orders entered after
the notice of appeal were filed should stand, including the
award

of attorney's fees entered in the April 5, 1981

hearing.
6.

Because of the plaintiff's frivilous appeal,

dilatory action in processing the appeal, and evidence that
the appeal was filed in bad faith, this matter should be
referred back to trial court for the award of attorney's
fees to the defendant for his fees paid in defending himself
on appeal.
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Respectfully submitted this

22

day of December, 1982.

MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

By~-""~~~;_..~---------------Je
• T orne
Att

ney for Respondent
P • O • Box "F "
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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I hereby certify that I mailed/ true and correct copyof the foregoing Brief of Responden , postage prepaid, to
Lowell V. Summerhays, 420 Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101 this . . z~day of December, 1982.

~~~~~

Pegg~==on;Secretary
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